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THE

COiMMERCE CLAUSE, THE STATE'S POLICE
POWER AND INTOXICATING LIQUORS
By H.

APPLETON FEDERA*

Intoxicating liquors have been the subject in controversy
in many of the leading cases interpreting the commerce clause1
and the state's police power. 2 The growth of these two branches
of law will be found to be intertwined with the growth of the
law relating to intoxicating liquors.
After the adoption of the Federal Constitution it was
inevitable that the state's police power and the Federal
authority 3 under the commerce clause would conflict in certain
instances, though the possibility that the police power might
hold the field was thought extremely remote; however, that
which may not be done directly may sometimes result from
1ndirection. The Supreme Court's decisions involving transportation of intoxicating liquors are peculiarly significant in
indicating this possibility.
The subject of transportation of intoxicating liquors in
interstate commerce may be divided into four fields:
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)

Importation into a state from a foreign country;
Importation into a state from a sister state or territory under the jurisdiction of the United States;
Exportation from a state; and
Transportation through a state.

Before examining these four fields it may be interesting
to point out that during the latter part of the nineteenth
century the Supreme Court decided that intoxicating liquors
* B. A., University of Louisville, 1935; LL. B., University of Louisville, 1937; Attorney, Kentucky Department of Revenue, Frankfort,
Kentucky.
3Pierce
v. New Hampshire, 5 Haw. 104. This case first limited the
original package doctrine to imports from foreign countries, and
Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100 in overruling the former case first
applied
the original package doctrine to imports from another state.
2
Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623. This case laid down the rule a
state might under the police power pass a prohibition law without paying for
property thereby rendered useless.
3
The commerce clause has both jurisdictional and grant of power
features. A state may not act in the field in some instances even in
the absence of congressional action.
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were products in which a right of traffic existed and thus were
legitimate articles of interstate commerce. 4 Liquors at that time
were considered within the same category as any other merchandise, but late decisions5 indicate that the court has reclassified
these products.

(1)

The Importation into a State from a Foreign Country

Our first indication that there might be a distinction between imports from a foreign country and imports from a sister
state came in the case of Pierce v. New Hampshire (the License
Cases)( when the court failed to apply the original package
doctrine to imports from a sister state. Previous to this in
Brown v. Maryland,7 a case not involving intoxicating liquors,
the original package doctrine was first announced. The importation affected in the latter case was from a foreign country. Under the original package doctrine as expressed therein,
an article authorized by a law of Congress to be imported from
a foreign country was subject to no restriction or exaction
other than that imposed by Congress, so long as it remained in
the hands of the importer for sale in the original bale, package
or vessel in which it was imported and the authority given to
import necessarily carried with it the right to sell the imported
article in the form and shape in which it was imported, but
when the original package was broken up for use or for retail
by the importer or when the commodity passed into the hands
of a purchaser, then it ceased to be an import or a part of
foreign commerce and became incorporated into the mass of
property in the state, and was from that point subject to the
laws of that state like any other property.
The Wilson Act s took from all imports of intoxicating
liquors, whether from a foreign country or a sister state, the
protection of the original package doctrine. This Act of Congress subjected these liquors to the state's police power upon
their arrival to be used, consumed, stored or sold therein. But
the Webb-Kenyon Act 9 which stripped imports of intoxicating
I Lelsy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100. In re Rahrer, 194 U. S. 545.

rSamuels v. McCurdy, 267 U. S. 188; Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 84 Adv.
65 How. 504.
' 12 Wheat. 419.

Op. 107.

126 Stat. 313, 27 U. S. C. A. sec. 121.
137 Stat. 699, 49 Stat. 877, 27 U. S. C. A. see. 122.
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liquors from a sister state of the protection of the commerce
clause' 0 seemingly was not broad enough in its language to apply
to imports from a foreign country, so it was not until the passage
of the Twenty-first Amendment" that imports of these liquors
from a foreign country intended for delivery or use in a state
were subject to the state's police power prior to their arrival
at the importers.
(2)

The Importation into a State from a Sister State

The License Cases' 2 as has been pointed out first indicated
that a different rule applied to imports from a foreign country
as compared with imports from a sister state. In this case a
barrel of American gin was purchased in Boston, and carried
coastwise to a landing in New Hampshire, and there sold by
the importer in the same barrel. It was held by the Sapreme
Court that a state law might validly apply to a sale under such
circumstances. The Court took particular pains to point out
the distinctions between the case and that of Brown v. Maryland.13
For over forty years this case was not disputed; however,
after the decision in Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern Ry.
Co.,14 in which the Supreme Court held that a state could not
forbid the bringing of liquor within its bounds from another
state, the correctness of the holding in the License Cases was
questioned in Leisy v. Hardin.15 The Bowman opinion had
distinguished the ruling in the License Cases but in Leisy v.
Hardin the License Cases were overruled insofar as they decided
that the original package doctrine should not apply to imports
It was held that a state could not
from a sister state. 1
prohibit the sale within its borders of liquor in the original
package by the importer.
Thus, even in the absence of congressional action regulating
such traffic a state could not prevent the importation or the
10Infra, footnote 24.
"IInfra,footnote 27.

1Pierce v. New Hampshire, 5 How. 504.
' Stuqa, note 6.
1 125 U. S. 465. The majority of the court held that the statute
there questioned could not be upheld as an inspection or sanitary law.
'5135 U. S. 100.
The vigorous dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Gray weakens the
force of the majority opinion.

PoLICE POWER; INTOXICATniG LIQUORS

sale in original package of intoxicating liquors. These liquors
were treated as any other merchandise, the regulation of the
traffic being considered a problem requiring national rather
than local regulation. Needless to say, abuses of this exemption
from state control became prevalent.
The aftermath was the passage by Congress of the Wilson
Act 17 which provided that upon arrival in a state in which they
were to be used, consumed, sold or stored intoxicating liquors
were subjected to that state's police powers to the same extent
and in the same manner as such liquors produced in said
state. Further the Act divorced these liquors from the protection
of the original package doctrine. Promptly, a Kansas statute
prohibiting the sale of any intoxicating liquors was weighed
in the balance and found valid as applied to liquors imported
into the state.' 5
The passage of the Wilson Act was one of the first indications that public opinion did not agree when the Supreme Court
said that intoxicating liquors were legitimate articles of interstate commerce. 19 In Vance v. Vandercook Co. 2 0 limitations on the right to
import were not considered to be within the bounds laid out
by the Wilson Act and hence were invalid as burdens on interstate commerce. The importation which could not be affected
by a state law was not complete until the goods had been delivered
to the consignee or until the carrier ceased to hold the liquors
21
as a carrier.
The WVebb-Kenyon Act 22 was next passed by Congress in an
effort to plug up the loopholes still remaining after passage of
Stat. 313, 27 U. S. C. A. sdc. 12L
'In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545.
" The question of what is a legitimate article of interstate commerce is worth noting. In Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 84 Adv. Op. 107, there
is an intimation that a state may prevent intoxicating liquors from
becoming legitimate articles of interstate commerce,'yet as to importation of such liquors the court had held that liquors were to be treated
as any other merchandise. In Bowman v. Chicago & Northwestern
Ry. Co., 125 U. S. 465, the court mentions certain articles not considered legitimate.
20 170 U. S. 438.
= Rhodes v. Iowa, 170 U. S. 412. Where a statute is directed
against c.o.d. shipments and provides that the place where the money
is paid or the good delivered is the place of sale, this does not keep
statute from being invalid as an attempt to regulate interstate commerce. Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 206 U. S. 129.
2137 Stat. 699, 49 Stat. 877, 27 U. S. C. A. sec. 122.
1726
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the Wilson Act. 23 The effect of the Webb-Kenyon Act was to
prevent the importation of intoxicating liquors from one state
into another state for receipt, sale or any use therein in violation
of the laws of such state.24 This act withdrew from such
imports of intoxicating liquors the protective cloak of the com25
merce clause.
The Webb-Kenyon Act was not made ineffective by the
26
Eighteenth Amendment.
The effect of the Twenty-first Amendment 27 is similar to
that of the Webb-Kenyon Act 28 save that it seemingly applies
both to liquors brought from foreign countries and liquors
imported from other states. It does not apply to intoxicating
liquors being transported through a state or exported from a
29
state.
One unusual interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment
is found in the Young's Market decision written by Mr. Justice
Brandeis. 30 It was there held that limitations placed upon
imported liquors might be more stringent than those placed
upon liquors manufactured within the state. The following
expression was used:
"A classification recognized by the Twenty-first Amendment cannot be deemed forbidden by the Fourteenth."
The Justice, however, then went on to indicate that there
was a substantial reason for the classification in question in
that the brewer in California paid a brewer's fee which was
higher than the importer's fee.
As to imports, we may say that even in the absence of
congressional legislation covering the subject, the commerce
21
24Supra, footnote 17.

Seemingly the Webb-Kenyon Act would not have been applicable
to a shipment of liquors from a foreign country but would as to any
shipment from a place under the jurisdiction of the United States.
25Ziffrin, Inc. v. Martin, 24 F. Supp. 924. Although the case of
Commonwealth v. One Dodge Motor Truck, 326 Pa. 120, 191 Atl. 690,
construed the Webb-Kenyon Act as applying also to exports of intoxicating liquor.
McCormick & Co., Inc. v. Brown, 286 U. S. 131.
"The transportation or importation into any state, territory or
possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited."
'I Supra, footnote 22.
21Ziffrin, Inc. v. Reeves, 84 Adv. Op. 107.
30State Board of Equalization v. Young's Market, 299 U. S. 59.
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clause was ruled superior to a state's police power but that
Congress first in the Webb-Kenyon Act and later the people
in the Twenty-first Amendment determined that the police
power should rule.
(3)

The Exportation from a State

The question of whether a state might control the exportation of intoxicating liquors has not until recently come before
the courts of last resort of this country. Probably several
reasons can be given for its tardy appearance. It might be
said that many states' attorney generals considered the Bowman 3 l and Leisy 32 decisions as being almost controlling of the
matter, that what had to be national in scope as to importation
must of necessity be national in scope as to exportation.
Secondly, the problem of controlling exports has been a problem
only to the large liquor producing states.
The first case to give the problem any attention was Kidd v.
Pearson,3 3 which was not treated as a case involving transportation in interstate commerce at all. In that case, Iowa had a law
which limited the traffic or sale of intoxicating liquors to the
manufacture or sale within the state for mechanical, medicinal,
culinary, and sacremental purposes, but for no other use-not
even for the purpose of transportation beyond the limits of the
state. The Supreme Court treated the case as one involving
the right of a state to condition the manufacture of such liquors
so that none would be exported. Indeed the following paragraph is enlightening as to what the Court thought:
"The main vice in this argument consists in the unqualified assumption that the statute legalizes the manufacture. The proposition
that, supposing the goods were once lawfully called'into existence, it
would then be beyond the power of the State either to forbid or impede
their exportation may be conceded. Here, however, the very question
underlying the case is whether the goods ever came lawfully into
existence. It is a grave error to say that the statute 'expressly authorized' the manufacture for it did not. . ....

Thus, dictum in this case indicates that a state might not
11Supra, footnote 14.
- Supra, footnote 15.
13128 U. S. 1. This decision also allowed the commerce in liquors
to be divided into interstate and intrastate, prohibiting the former and
permitting the latter.
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limit the exportation of goods "legally called into existence.''84
So the question of regulating the exportation, as distinguished
from prohibiting the manufacture for exportation, was governed
by this dictum until the Pennsylvania Superior and Supreme
Courts had occasion to pass on the matter. 35 The Pennsylvania
case involved the confiscation of a motor truck and forty-four
cases of liquor loaded thereon. The truck had received from a
distiller located in Schenley, Pennsylvania thirty-nia,; of these
cases of liquor for transportation to a consignee in Washington,
D. C. and five cases had been shipped from a distiller in Kentucky for delivery to a consignee in Baltimore, Maryland and
had been transported to Pittsburg by truck where the truck
in question received the load. The truck and cargo were seized
because of the failure of the driver or the company he was
working for to secure a permit for the transportation for hire
of said liquors; the driver defended by alleging the unconstitutionality of the act. The case divides itself into two problems, the regulation of exportation and secondly, the regulation
of transportation through the state. As to the right to regulate
the exports the decision rests upon three bases:
(1) The Webb-Kenyon Act intended to prohibit the
transportation in interstate commerce of all liquor in any manner used in violation of any law of the state.
(2) The state had the power to prohibit the manufacture
of alcoholic liquors within its borders even though intended
for shipment out of the state and the power to prohibit absolutely includes the power to impose regulations, one of which
is how those intoxicating liquors shall be transported.
'4 It is the opinion of the writer that this dictum has been in effect
overruled by Samuels v. McCurdy, 267 U. S. 568, which case held that
goods lawfully called into existence could be subjected to the police
power. Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S. 52 also Involves the impeding of
the exportation of certain goods lawfully called into existence.
5 Commonwealth v. One Dodge Motor Truck, 123 Pa. Super. 311,
187 Atl. 461, affirmed 326 Pa. 120, 191 Atl. 590, 110 A. L. R. 919. Actually both the questions of exportation from the state and transportation through the state were presented and were passed upon. As to
the latter question, see infra, footnote 59. Jefferson County Distilling
Co. v. Clifton, 249 Ky. 815, 61 S. W. (2d) 645, 88 A. L. R. 1361 is the
first case which indicated that a state could regulate its exports of
liquors manufactured therein on the theory that the whisky was manufactured subject to the condition that it would only be exported in a
certain manner for a certain purpose, but the question of regulating
the exportation of goods lawfully called into existence is not passed
upon.
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(3) Liquor manufactured in the state does not become the
subject of legal commerce or transportation for delivery either
within or without the state unless or until loaded for delivery
on a vehicle authorized by law to transport it.
The first basis was expressly disapproved by a three judge
Federal district court in Ziffrin, IRe., v. Martin3" in which
opinion it was determined that the Webb-Kenyon Act applies
only to imports. The second and third points, however, were
approved by the Supreme Court in the appeal of the Ziffrin
case. 37 This third point was first expressed in Jefferson County
Distilling Co. v. Clifton38 it is believed.
In the Ziffrin case the constitutioilality of a Kentucky 3 9
act requiring a transporter's license to transport for hire intoxicating liquors to or from premises in Kentucky by road was
questioned. An additional factor was added as the law provided
that only a transporter holding a common carrier's certificate
was eligible to secure a liquor transporter's license. This last
requirement was laid down on the theory that as common carriers run over definite routes and on schedule, it would lessen
the job of patrolling intoxicating liquors so that they do not
get into illegal channels. A contract carrier questioned the
constitutionality of the act.
The decision by Mr. Justice MeReynolds places the right of
the state to provide for a license to export for hire over the
roads on two grounds: (1) the state having the power to prohibit the manufacture, sale, transportation or possession of
intoxicants manifestly had the lesser power of regulating the
exportation; (2) the state has permitted the manufacture of
whisky only upon condition that it be sold to an indicated class
of customers and transported in definitely specified ways and
as the act declares such liquor removed from permitted channels contraband, property so circumstanced cannot be regarded
as a proper article of commerce.
1624 Fed. Supp. 924. Decision affirmed by Supreme Court, Ziffrin,
Inc. v. Reeves, 84 Adv. Op. 107
Supra, footnote 25.
249 Ky. 815, 61 S. W. (2d) 645.
"Kentucky being the largest producer of whisky has the problem
of preventing whisky which is manufactured or stored within the state
from getting into illegal channels while supposedly being exported.
The problem of most states is to see that whisky is not illegally
imported.
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Both these grounds merit close examination because it is
believed that they present new contributions to the field of commerce clause law never before enunciated by the Supreme
Court.
The statement that the greater power includes the less
often has been applied by the Supreme tribunal 40 but as was
sagely pointed out by Mr. Justice Holmes:
"It is true that the greater does not always include the less. A
man may give his property away, yet he may not contract with a
carrier to take the risk of the latter's negligently injuring it, or part
with it on the valuable consideration of a wager. But in general the
rule holds good."':
But whether a state could regulate, as distinguished from

prohibiting, her exports seemed an entirely new question to that
Court.
It had been held that a state could prevent certain objects
from being exported to another state such as unripe citrus

fruits, 42 dead horses,4 3 wild game, 44 river waters 45 and whisky

which was manufactured upon condition that it be not exported. 46
None of these cases, though, involved the regulation of
products leaving the state; indeed, had the Court been so
inclined it might have distinguished these cases by saying that
the articles there involved were prohibited before they reached
the flow of interstate commerce. The Court could have adhered
to the dictum in Kidd v. Pearsonand said that once the product
was manufactured for export purposes, the state could not condition how it was to be exported. It may be pointed out that the
Sligh case 47 would have caused difficulty had such a tack been
followed because what was prohibited there was the shipping or
delivering for shipment out of the state of part of the citrus
43
crop. This seems to take one step beyond the Kidd v. Pearson
0 Seaboard Air Line v. North Carolina, 245 U. S. 298; State Board
of Equalization v. Young's Market, 299 U. S. 59; Rippey v. Texas, 193
U. S.504; Davis v. Mass., 167 U. S.43; Packard v. Banton, 264 U. S.
140; Eberle v. Michigan, 232 U. S.700; Title Co. v. Wilcox Bldg., 302
U. S.120.
"Ripley v. Texas, 193 U. S.504.
' Sligh v. Kirkwood, 237 U. S.52.
43 Clason v. Indiana, 306 U. S. 439.
Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U. S.519.
4 Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U. S. 349.
Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U. S.1.
47 Supra, footnote 42.
48
Supra, footnote 33.
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decision where the whisky was only allowed to be manufactured
on condition that it would not be exported. Logically, the
Ziffrtj 49 decision seems to be a step beyond the Sligh50 ruling
insofar as it says that having the power to forbid transportation
the state has the power to regulate it.
Let us examine the second ground upon which the Court
rests the decision; that the liquor was not an article of commerce unless kept in the permitted channels.
In Samuels v. Mcurdy5 ' the Supreme Court espoused the
doctrine that intoxicating liquors were products in which the
state might reduce property rights. In the Ziffrin case the
Court thus applies this doctrine and holds that a state may
say only liquors in certain channels are legitimate subjects of
interstate commerce.
"The statute declares whisky removed from permitted channels
contraband subject to immediate seizure. This is within the police
power of the state; and property so circumstanced cannot be regarded
as a proper article for commerce."

Further in the opinion it is said:
"Property rights in intoxicants depend on state laws and cease if
the liquor becomes contraband."

This control which the state may function must attach prior
to the flow of interstate commerce. The point at which the flow
begins has been determined to be the delivery to a carrier for
52
transportation out of the state.
But the points at which Federal authority begins and state
authority ends are highly mobile, and it is not certain how far
these two points overlap. For example, the Supreme Court
has held that a state cannot regulate the purchase of grain which
is to be shipped out of the state.53 Yet the Court has held in
the Ziffrin case that a state may prescribe whether liquor shall
go into interstate commerce or how it shall go therein. On the
other hand, the Court has approved Federal acts which throw
the line demarking the Federal authority far into that territory
theretofore thought limited to state control.
" Supra, footnote 36.
wSupra, footnote 42.
'267 U. S. 188.
'Texas, Etc., R. R. Co. v. Sabine Tram Co., 227 U. S. 111, McCluskey v. Marysville & N. R. Co., 243 U. S. 36.
6 Lemke v. Farmers' Grain Co., 285 U. S. 50; Dahnke-Walker Milling Co. v. Bondurant, 257 U. S. 282.

K. L. J.-6
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In holding the National Labor Relations Act constitutional, 54 Mr. Chief Justice Hughes said:
"The congressional authority to protect interstate commerce from
burdens and obstructions is not limited to transactions which can be
deemed to be an essential part of a "flow" of interstate or foreign commerce. Burdens and obstructions may be due to Injurious action
springing from Other sources-. Although activities may be intrastate
in character when separately considered if they have such a close and
substantial relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise that control."

So if Congress should decide to control the exports of
intoxicating liquors, "obstructions" in the form of regulatory
laws by the states might be found conflicting. It would not
be difficult for a court to see in the above-quoted excerpt
authorization to Congress to regulate or prohibit all manufacturing of whisky for export purposes, or perhaps even all
manufacturing of such liquors whether for export or not.
Although the question cannot be answered, one wonders
if the attempted regulation of exports of intoxicating liquor
by the Federal Government would prevent a state from exercising the authority approved in the Ziffrin case. It may be that
the Federal authority extends to the manufacturing Congress
sees fit to go so far, or it may be that the State has the solitary
authority to prohibit, condition or permit manufacturing. It is
obvious that the answer, when it is finally written by the Supreme
Court, will determine whether as to exports manufactured in the
state, the state or Federal authority is supreme. 55
Finally it might be noted that the One Dodge case and the
Ziffrin case were both regulations of exporting by highway,
A case involving exportation by railroad might experience more
difficulty although no distinction is apparently made in either
opinion.
(4)

The TransporationThrough a State.

May a state regulate the hauling across it of certain commodities considered dangerous or certain articles which may
produce dangerous results ?
National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.,
301 U. S. 1.
It shoudd be pointed out that a state not attempting to control
exports by conditioning the manufacture could lose its authority if Congress saw fit to attempt to regulate the interstate commerce in whiskies
While a state which saw fit to condition the manufacturing might have
its authority approved.
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With regard to the transportation of trucks and automobiles across a state, the Supreme Court has approved state regulatory measures.5 6 However, these cases involved the doctrine
of the control of the roads and do not answer the questiou posed.
The Supreme Court has approved state regulatory acts
which affected the interstate operations of railroads57 but those
cases involve not the transportation of a product but the operation of the transporting vehicle.
As has been previously pointed out, the Pennsylvania courts
in Commonwealth v. ONe Dodge Motor Trztek 5s did pass on the
question presented. It was there held that a state could regulate the through transportation of intoxicants by requiring that
they be carried by a licensed carrier."9 The Pennsylvania court
based its opinion on the "control of the road cases" and "railroad" cases already adverted to. It further held the Webb
Kenyon Act 60 applicable, a point open to serious doubt.0 '
On the other hand, the Supreme Court of Appeals of V'irginia in Surles v. Commonwealth0 2 held that Virginia had no
authority to require a memorandum signed by the consignor,
showing the route to be traveled by the transporting vehicle
while in Virginia. The opinion states that "whisky is now
a legitimate article of commerce and save to the extent noted,
is entitled to the privileges of merchandise generally."
It is believed by the writer of this article that the present
members of the Supreme Court of the United States would
find in the Bingaman and Barnwel 63 cases a sufficient parallel
to allow a state to provide non-discriminatory regulation of dangerous cargoes being transported by truck across a state in
the absence of Federal regulation. It is further believed that
the Ziffrin cases places intoxicating liquor within the category
of regulatable cargoes. If the time should come when Congress
"Morf v. Bingaman, 298 U. S. 407; South Carolina Highway Department v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U. S. 177.
"Hennington v. Georgia, 163 U. S. 299; Smith v. Alabama, 124
U. S. 465; C. R. & P. Ry. Co. v. Ark., 219 U. S. 453.
326 Pa. 120, 191 Atl. 590.
"Again it should be pointed out that regulation of transportation
by road might be approved while regulation of transportation bY railroad disapproved.
"Supra, footnote 9.
"Supra, footnote 36.
02200 S. E. 636.
1

Supra, footnote 56.
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should see fit to attempt to lay down regulatory measures for
the control of the through traffic in alcoholic beverages, then
an additional question will be posed. There seems to be but
little question that the transportation of dangerous cargoes
by railway may be within the purview of congressional action
but the question of whether Congress may regulate through
traffic by road in certain commodities to the exclusion of regulation by the state is a more difficult question. 4 True, a test
of the Motor Carrier's Act of 1935 might be a partial answer
to the question, but so far the constitutionality of this Act has
not been passed upon by the Supreme Court. That there might
be a constitutional question has been pointed out in a note in
65
the Columbia Law Review.
Although no grounds can be given for so believing other
than that Federal powers are in the ascendency, it is thought
that the court, when the question arises, will treat truck traffic
in substantially the same manner as railroad traffic. If this
is done, then the Federal power under the commerce clause will
emerge superior to the state police power insofar as regulation
of through truck traffic in intoxicating liquors is conerned.

1 That there might be a difference in the congressional authority
to regulate railroad and highway traffic is intimated by a statement of
Mr. Justice Stone in South Carolina Highway Department v. Barnwell
Bros., 303 U. S. 177.
1136 Col. L. Rev. 945. This point was mentioned but not relied
upon in oral argument before the Supreme Court in Ziffrin, Inc., v.
Reeves, and no comment was made by members of the Court nor was
the point mentioned in the opinion by Mr. Justice McReynolds.
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